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• The economic importance of accounting standards has been confirmed by
recent controversy over ‘mark-to-market’ accounting. The SEC should favour
accounting standards that best serve investors’ information needs.
• Global harmonisation of accounting standards is in US interests, as a
pioneering experiment in effective global financial governance and as a
policy instrument against market fragmentation. The SEC should work
towards adoption of International Financial Reporting Standards (IFRS) in
the US before the end of the next decade.
• However, the SEC should insist on three conditions: clarification of the
international standard-setter’s mandate and an overhaul of its governance
and funding framework, to better represent and empower its stakeholders;
continuously high standards, which should not be compromised by the
objective of achieving US GAAP convergence; and consistent enforcement
across jurisdictions that have mandated or authorised the use of IFRS.
Progress on these three dimensions is a precondition for the SEC to set a
specific target date for the shift from US GAAP to IFRS.
The text of this policy contribution was sent on 20 April 2009 in response to
the SEC’s public consultation about its proposed rule “Roadmap for the Poten-
tial Use of Financial Statements Prepared in Accordance with International Fi-
nancial Reporting Standards by U.S. Issuers” (SEC File No. S7-27-08)
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A US STRATEGY FOR IFRS ADOPTION
Response to the US SEC’s public consultation
NICOLAS VÉRON,APRIL 2009
Attn. Elizabeth M. Murphy,
Secretary U.S. Securities and Exchange
Commission
100 F Street, N.E., Washington, D.C. 20549
Re: Roadmap for the Potential Use of Financial
Statements Prepared in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards by
U.S. Issuers / File No. S7-27-08
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
It is in the U.S. interest to favor success of the
“global accounting experiment”, the endeavor to
set common accounting standards for the entire
world. SEC decisions about U.S. recognition of IFRS
will have a significant impact on this project. The
SEC must articulate a clear long-term vision for
IFRS, compatible with political and economic
realities both in and outside the U.S. It must also
implement its vision flexibly enough to
accommodate the multiple tensions in this policy
area, which have been emphasized and
exacerbated by the financial crisis as illustrated
in particular by the controversies over fair value
accounting.
Specifically, clarity of purpose is needed in three
broad areas: 
1. Mandate, Governance, and Funding: The
standard-setting organization needs a
governance framework that suits its global
responsibility. Its mandate must be clarified,
with an unambiguous orientation towards
investors’ information needs. The SEC should
defend financial reporting transparency as
contributive not detrimental to financial
stability, including in the current crisis
environment. The poorly designed “Monitoring
Board” created earlier this year must be
replaced by a broader governing body with fair
representation of IFRS stakeholders in
coherence with the mandate, which should
entail strong representation and empowerment
of global users of financial information. In
parallel, the SEC should insist on a complete
overhaul of the standard-setting organization’s
funding framework. 
2. Standards Content and Quality: Quality of
standards, in compliance with the mandate of
international standard-setting, must be the top
priority, above convergence between IFRS and
U.S. GAAP. A revamped agenda-setting process
should also incorporate the aim of reducing the
unnecessary complexity that has developed under
IFRS, and improve the standards’ enforceability. 
3. Enforcement:Switching from U.S. GAAP to IFRS
can only be justified if the benefits of enhanced
comparability are greater than the significant
transition costs. As a consequence,
international consistency of implementation
and enforcement should be an integral part of
the SEC’s strategy for IFRS recognition. The SEC
should create strong coordination structures
with the world’s accounting enforcement
agencies to promote best practices and
prevent local regulatory capture. In Europe, it
should encourage the integration of
enforcement capacities at EU level.
Given the magnitude and complexity of these
requirements, it will be difficult for the SEC at this
stage to set a firm date for IFRS adoption in the
U.S. However, it should exert significant pressure
to ensure rapid progress in the three directions
indicated above, so as to enable completion of U.S.
adoption before the end of the next decade.‘SEC decisions about IFRS recognition will have a significant impact beyond the U.S. To a large
extent, the SEC’s attitude will determine the future of the International Accounting Standards
Board. An outright rejection of IFRS by the SEC would severely impair the IASB’s credibility.’
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Dear Ms. Murphy and Commissioners:
I greatly appreciate the opportunity to comment
on the SEC Roadmap for the Potential Use of Fi-
nancial Statements Prepared in Accordance with
International Financial Reporting Standards
(IFRS) by U.S. Issuers (File No. S7-27-08).
Bruegel is a European think tank devoted to inter-
national economics, which started operations in
Brussels in 2005 with the support of a number of
European member state governments and inter-
national companies. Its publications, research
programme, and other detailed information are
available at www.bruegel.org. 
Bruegel’s stated aim is to contribute to the quality
of economic policymaking in Europe through
open, fact-based and policy-relevant research,
analysis and discussion. Global interdependence
in accounting standard-setting is such that the
present communication to the SEC falls under this
mandate. As explained below, the impact of the
SEC’s future decisions on IFRS recognition will
extend far beyond the U.S. borders and will affect
European policymaking in a material way. 
This note represents my personal views as a re-
search fellow, not those of Bruegel as an organi-
zation. Accounting standard-setting is a topic to
which I have devoted significant attention since
2002. I believe that my Bruegel work, private con-
sulting activity, and nonprofit activities1do not in-
troduce a commercial or special-interest bias to
my views nor do they impair the integrity of my re-
search in the debate about accounting standard-
setting. 
GENERAL POLICY ORIENTATION
Much is at stake in the debate on IFRS recognition
in the U.S. The most immediate impact is that any
decision will have implications for U.S. companies,
investors on U.S. capital markets, and U.S. finan-
cial competitiveness. If it results in lower-quality
financial reporting, or if the increase in financial
reporting quality and/or comparability does not
compensate for the cost of transition2, then IFRS
should not be endorsed by the SEC. 
But this is not the only dimension that the SEC
should consider. Seen in a global context, future
SEC decisions about IFRS recognition will have a
significant impact beyond the U.S.: 
• To a large extent, the SEC’s attitude will deter-
mine the future of the International Account-
ing Standards Board (IASB). SEC endorsement
has arguably been the central strategic objec-
tive of the IASB since its creation in 2001, and
of the International Accounting Standards Com-
mittee (IASC) for several years before. If only
for this reason, an outright rejection of IFRS by
the SEC would severely impair the IASB’s cred-
ibility. Absent the prospect of future U.S. adop-
tion of IFRS, existing strains could develop to
undermine the ability of the IASB to lead inter-
national accounting standard-setting. It is
imaginable that IFRS would then gradually un-
ravel: non-U.S. jurisdictions, including those
which have already adopted IFRS, may entrust
future standard-setting to regional or national
bodies, or alternative global standards issued
by other standard-setting entities may super-
sede IFRS. 
• Beyond accounting, the outcome will have
implications for global financial governance
more generally. Though perhaps not the most
visible to the general public, international
accounting standards-setting is one of the
most advanced experiments in financial and
even economic policymaking on a global scale.
Failure of this experiment may negatively
1. These include
participation in the
Accounting and Auditing
Practices Committee of the
International Corporate
Governance Network since
2004, and in the CFA
Institute’s Corporate
Disclosure Policy Council
since 2008.
2. See Luzi Hail, Christian
Leuz and Peter Wysocki,
“Global Accounting
Convergence and the
Potential Adoption of IFRS
by the United States: An
Analysis of Economic and
Policy Factors”, February
2009, available at
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1
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impact the prospect of other comparable
endeavors in the future. 
• This point is given additional importance by the
current crisis context, which considerably
amplifies the potential effects of regulatory
choices. We are close to a bifurcation point
between global financial market fragmentation
and the creation of stronger international
financial policy frameworks3. Decisions by the
SEC on IFRS recognition will be part of the
balance of forces that determine the eventual
outcome. 
Given this, I recommend the following policy
orientations: 
• The SEC should reaffirm the aim of a single set
of high-quality accounting standards applied
throughout the globe as a guiding principle of
its policy in this area – as agreed upon by the
U.S. in successive G20 summit declarations, on
15 November 2008 and 2 April 2009. In spite
of the formal G20 agreement, temptations exist
in jurisdictions which have adopted IFRS or
variations thereof, including the European
Union, to shift back to regional standard-setting
in view of the tensions experienced with the
IASB. The U.S., and the SEC on its behalf, has a
responsibility to make credible the prospect of
complete global accounting standards
harmonization. 
• The SEC should confirm conditional support for
the IASB as global standard-setter. Under
Chairman Christopher Cox, such support was
expressed with clarity but the relative absence
of conditionality met strong and legitimate
resistance inside the U.S. The SEC’s support
should be maintained, but it should be
conditional to ensure sustainability. The IASB
and IASCF Foundation (IASCF) currently remain
the world’s, and the SEC’s, best hope to attain
the aim mentioned in the previous paragraph
in a reasonable timeframe. Their achievements
towards this aim in the past decade have been
remarkable, in spite of recent decisions which
have to some extent jeopardized their role and
authority, including the rushed change brought
to accounting for financial instruments under
pressure from the European Union in October
2008. IFRS have been adopted or are being
adopted in many jurisdictions, and their
implementation in the European Union and
other jurisdictions has led to generally higher-
quality financial reporting from the point of
view of users4, at a manageable transition cost.
Thus, the SEC should specify conditions for IFRS
recognition while allowing for future policy
flexibility, especially on timing (see below), in
a spirit not unlike that of the initial roadmap
document5. 
In the next sections I outline suggested conditions
for IFRS recognition in three key areas: the man-
date, governance and funding of the IASCF and
IASB; the content of the standards they produce;
and the adoption and enforcement framework. The
first and second items are within the decision-
making remit of the IASCF and IASB, while the third
one depends on individual jurisdictions and inter-
national bodies other than the IASCF/IASB. 
IASCF/IASB MANDATE, GOVERNANCE AND FUNDING
• The SEC should foster clarity of the IASCF’s
mandate. “Quality” of accounting standards, as
referred to in the IASCF’s Constitution6, does
not exist in a vacuum, and must be assessed
against collective-interest objectives and pri-
oritization of stakeholders. Consistent with its
recently issued report on the impact of mark-
to-market accounting7, the SEC should affirm
its commitment to accounting standards de-
signed to serve as a priority the needs of capi-
tal providers. Furthermore, it should ensure
that this vision is not only the SEC’s and that it
is shared throughout the U.S. government, in-
cluding prudential supervisors. Many voices,
though not all, in the global supervisory and
central banking community concur that in-
vestor-oriented accounting standards are not
only compatible with the aim of financial sta-
bility, but also can contribute to it8. The SEC
should make it clear that the obvious need for
the IASB to appropriately liaise with prudential
3. See for example the
Financial Times
editorial, “Lessons
learnt for capitalism’s
future”, 14 April 2009:
“The current mismatch
of globalised finance
and national
governance is
unsustainable. Either
governance becomes
more globalised or
finance less globalised”. 
4. See for example AFG and
FFSA, Investor Perspectives
on IFRS Implementation,
Paris, December 2007.
5. Donald Nicolaisen, “A
Securities Regulator
Looks at Convergence”,
Northwestern University
Journal of International
Law and Business, April
2005.
6. The Constitution
currently refers to “a
single set of high
quality, understandable
and enforceable global
accounting standards
that require high quality,
transparent and
comparable information
in financial statements
and other financial
reporting to help
participants in the
world’s capital markets
and other users make
economic decisions”
(Article 2).
7. Office of the SEC Chief Ac-
countant and SEC Divi-
sion of Corporation
Finance, “Report and
Recommendations Pur-
suant to Section 133 of
the Emergency Eco-
nomic Stabilization Act
of 2008: Study on Mark-
To-Market Accounting”,
December 2008
8. See Claudio Borio and
Kostas Tsatsaronis,
“Risk in financial report-
ing: status, challenges
and suggested direc-
tions”, Bank for Interna-
tional Settlements
Working Paper No 213,
August 2006Nicolas Véron A US STRATEGY FOR IFRS ADOPTION
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supervisors, as has been emphasized in the
declaration of the London Summit on 2 April,
should not be interpreted as a dilution of stan-
dard-setting’s orientation towards investors’
needs. It should see to it that the long overdue
revision of the IASB’s conceptual framework
does not introduce ambiguity on this point. 
• The SEC should also foster a comprehensive
overhaul of the IASCF’s governance framework,
which does not currently correspond to the
IASCF’s global responsibilities. The Monitoring
Board established earlier this year is inherently
dysfunctional, and marginal changes to its
design cannot correct its fundamental flaws.
The central idea of the Monitoring Board, which
is to replicate the accountability channels of
national standard-setters vis-à-vis national
governments9, remains impractical as long as
humankind does not submit itself to a global
government. Furthermore, the concern to keep
the Monitoring Board very small has led to key
stakeholders being left out without apparent
justification, and an absence of clarity of the
criteria which led to the Board members’
selection10. The SEC should promote a
transformation of the Monitoring Board into a
broader Governing Body that would better
represent the global stakeholders of IFRS. This
governing body should specifically entail a high
degree of accountability to representatives of
the investment community, in coherence with
the previous paragraph about the
organization’s mandate, and also include
representation of other stakeholder categories
such as analysts, auditors, preparers,
alongside national and regional regulators and
political authorities. It should be governed by
the IASCF’s Constitution11. It should also put an
end to the fiction that the Monitoring Board’s
task can be artificially limited to Trustee
appointments and reappointments (let alone
to actual monitoring), which is contradicted by
the present Monitoring Board’s already
sweeping prerogatives12. The governing body
should, in particular, be sole competent to
amend the IASCF’s Constitution. These
recommendations are not trivial to implement.
They entail a degree of organizational
complexity, and require a spirit of institutional
innovativeness that the IASCF has not much
displayed in recent years. But reform along
such lines is the only sustainable way to
ensure the desired legitimacy, independence
and authority. 
• Finally, the SEC should foster a rethink of the
IASCF’s funding structure, which is currently
built on an underlying concept of taxation with-
out representation13 and is therefore neither
sound nor sustainable. The SEC should encour-
age the IASCF to align the funding structure
with the representation of global stakeholders
as outlined in the previous paragraph, as op-
posed to country-based funding schemes as
have been developed since 2006.
I am aware that the recommendations in the two
previous paragraphs would lead to a framework of
governance and accountability which has no
obvious precedents among existing global
organizations. But the task that the IASCF has
given itself, the autonomous setting at global level
of norms with as much economic impact as
accounting standards, is also without precedent.
Thus, the IASCF cannot escape the need to find
innovative institutional responses to this largely
unprecedented challenge. 
CONTENT OF IFRS
Even though the IASCF’s identity and governance
will be a key determinant of the future quality of
IFRS, the SEC should also ground its future deci-
sions on the content of the standards themselves
and on the characteristics of the process under
‘The SEC should foster a comprehensive overhaul of the IASCF’s governance framework, and
promote a transformation of the Monitoring Board into a broader Governing Body that would
better represent the global stakeholders of IFRS.’
9. Press release of the
IASCF, 29 January 2009:
“This basic approach to the
architecture of governance
is similar to that in place in
many national jurisdictions
for accounting standard-
setters”.
10. For a more in-depth
analysis, see my testimony
in the IASCF’s Constitution
Review Round Table of 19
June 2008, subsequently
published as “Empower
Users of Financial
Information as the IASC
Foundation’s Stakeholders”,
Bruegel Policy Contribution
series, July 2008.
11. By contrast, the Charter
of the Monitoring Board,
adopted on 1 April 2009, is
outside the remit of the
IASCF Constitution. In my
view this is incompatible
with the autonomy of the
IASB. See the comment
letter by Deloitte in
response to the IASCF’s
consultation on the
establishment of the
Monitoring Board (Review
of the IASCF Constitution),
19 September  2008:
“Agreeing to the creation of
a monitoring group without
knowing exactly what its
powers or terms of
reference are to be, and
where within (or out-with)
the governance system of
the IASC Foundation it is to
fit would represent a ‘leap of
faith’ on behalf of the IFRS
community”. 
12. As set out in the
Memorandum of
Understanding to
Strengthen the Institutional
Framework of the IASCF of 1
April, which establishes the
Trustees’ relationship with
the Monitoring Board.
13. The IASCF’s euphemism
for taxation is “non-
voluntary funding”, in the
Preamble of the
Memorandum of
Understanding referred to in
the previous note.A US STRATEGY FOR IFRS ADOPTIONNicolas Véron
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which they are prepared and adopted. Under this
objective: 
• The SEC should insist on standards quality
above convergence. The convergence process
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP, initiated under the
Norwalk Agreement of 2002 between the IASB
and FASB and the subsequent Memorandum of
Understanding of February 2006, has not al-
ways been conducive to an enhancement of
standards quality, and in some cases can be
specifically identified as a cause of decrease in
quality of IFRS14. Such developments are dou-
bly detrimental, through the direct impact on fi-
nancial reporting but also because they tend to
undermine the acceptance of IFRS outside the
U.S., by making standard-setting appear as
dominated by U.S. special interests as opposed
to the interests of users of financial informa-
tion prepared using IFRS. Convergence between
IFRS and U.S. GAAP is a legitimate aim for the
SEC, as it potentially lowers the cost of transi-
tion to IFRS for U.S. issuers, but it should not be
allowed to supersede the more important ob-
jective of standards quality. 
• Consistent with the previous point, the SEC
should encourage improvement of the IASB’s
agenda-setting process which has been ex-
cessively dominated by the convergence ob-
jective since 2002 and especially since 2006.
Agenda-setting should instead be based on an
autonomous assessment of IFRS’ gaps and
shortcomings, such as currently on insurance
liabilities or the conceptual framework. Align-
ment of IFRS on U.S.  GAAP should be reserved
to cases where the latter offer unambiguously
superior solutions. 
• In the interest of users, the SEC should
encourage the IASB to reduce the complexityof
the current IFRS. There is a widespread
assessment in the user community that some
of the present complexity is not justified by the
requirement of high-quality financial
reporting15. 
• In a similar vein, the SEC should encourage the
IASB to ensure a better enforceability of IFRS
by reducing the degree of discretion granted to
companies in cases where such discretion is
not generally conducive to higher-quality
reporting. High-visibility developments such as
the booking in 2007 by Société Générale of a
trading loss incurred in January 2008, invoking
the “true and fair view override” under IAS 1,
and other less visible cases, have reinforced
the perception that there is significant room for
improvement of IFRS from that viewpoint. This
debate cannot and should not be reduced to the
largely misleading, though often heard, black-
and-white opposition between “principles-
based” and “rules-based” standards. 
CONSISTENT ADOPTION AND ENFORCEMENT
Comparability is a crucial promise of IFRS, and is
one of the parameters which the SEC needs to as-
sess in considering their future recognition in the
U.S. As mentioned in the previous paragraph, com-
parability can be enhanced by the content of IFRS
and the extent to which the standards limit com-
panies’ discretion in their financial reporting. Even
more important for comparability is the consis-
tency of adoption and enforcement practices
across jurisdictions. I do not include here a spe-
cific development about audit quality, but it is a
significant dimension from this point of view. 
• On adoption, the SEC should tailor the neces-
sary safeguards of U.S. national sovereignty so
as to preserve the vision of a single global set
of standards. As part of the responsibility
granted to it by U.S. legislation, the SEC should
‘The SEC should insist on standards quality above convergence. The convergence process
between IFRS and U.S. GAAP has not always been conducive to an enhancement of standards
quality, and in some cases has been a cause of decrease in quality of IFRS.’
14. One such case is the
adoption in 2006 of the
IFRS  8 standard on
operating segments.
See my note for the
European Parliament’s
Economic and Monetary
Affairs (ECON)
Committee, published
as “EU Adoption of the
IFRS8 Standard on
Operating Segments”,
Bruegel Policy
Contribution series,
September 2007.
15.  See for example
Moody’s Global
Corporate Finance
Special Comment, “Are
We Better Off Under
IFRS?”, November 2008.Nicolas Véron A US STRATEGY FOR IFRS ADOPTION
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keep a domestic safeguard mechanism simi-
lar to the EU’s endorsement mechanismintro-
duced in 2002 as a key component of the
decision to adopt IFRS there16. As in the origi-
nal EU regulation, this should allow the SEC to
adopt or reject any given IFRS standard or IFRIC
interpretation, but not to rewrite them or amend
their content including through the use of
“carve-outs”17. However, the SEC should simul-
taneously establish IFRS as issued in English
by the IASB as the sole standard for cross-bor-
der mutual recognition. Unlike the current prac-
tice of the European Commission, the SEC
should not grant “equivalent status” to ac-
counting standards other than “full IFRS”, in
order to avoid further fragmentation. 
• On enforcement, the SEC should promote
strong coordination mechanisms, which may
include binding arrangements, in order to en-
sure international consistency. One aspect of
this would be to foster a reduction of interna-
tional divergence by encouraging the European
Union to centralize enforcement of IFRS among
its member states through the establishment
of a “European Chief Accountant” who would be
delegated enforcement authority by most, or
ideally all, EU national relevant public authori-
ties18. Beyond the European Union, the SEC
should expand on existing efforts by the Inter-
national Organization of Securities Commis-
sions to coordinate IFRS enforcement. 
TIMING
To implement these recommendations, the SEC
will need to implement a difficult balancing act. On
the one hand, it should actively foster a consen-
sus about reform not only with the IASCF and IASB
but also with other authorities including the mem-
bers of the Monitoring Board as well as U.S. (and
likewise non-U.S.) prudential supervisors. On the
other hand, it should not indefinitely postpone de-
cisions on IFRS recognition under the pretext of
conditionality, which would carry a serious risk of
undermining the IASB’s credibility as argued
above. I recommend that the SEC clearly signal its
desire to adopt an improved set of IFRS under a
reformed IASCF/IASB in the second half of the next
decade. Obviously, many issuers would prefer to
immediately know a “date certain” and adjust their
planning accordingly19. But setting a firm target
date for IFRS adoption at this stage would in my
opinion be incompatible with the flexibility that
will be required to manage the complex set of pol-
icy developments which will inevitably unfold in
the meantime. It may be appropriate for the SEC
to set up a formal yearly progress review towards
this objective, perhaps in conjunction with the U.S.
Congress, with the aim of making rapid progress
that will eventually allow the announcement of a
firmer schedule.
I do not recommend allowing the optional use of
IFRS by U.S. issuers in the meantime, especially
not in the very short term as is envisaged in the
proposed rule. Such a “two-GAAP” situation would
inevitably lead to regulatory arbitrage by some
companies and may thus negatively impact both
the quality of financial reporting, and the reputa-
tion of both IFRS and U.S. GAAP. 
I am neutral as to whether the eventual adoption
of IFRS should occur over several years depend-
ing on the size of issuers, as envisaged in the pro-
posal rule. 
I am grateful to the SEC for giving me the opportu-
nity to offer my views on the proposed rule and
the broader debate about IFRS recognition in the
U.S. Of course, I would be delighted to develop the
items outlined in this letter if you or your staff
have questions or seek further elaboration of
them. 
Yours sincerely, 
Nicolas Véron
Email: n.veron@bruegel.org
Phone: +32 473 815 372
16. Regulation of the
European Parliament and
the Council 1606/2002 of
17 July 2002.
17. My understanding is
that the carve-out of IAS 39,
as set out in the European
Commission Regulation
(EC) 2086/2004 of 19
November 2004, is not
compliant with Regulation
1606/2002.
18. A sketchy proposal for
such a reform is outlined in
my 2007 essay The Global
Accounting Experiment,
Bruegel Blueprint series,
April 2007, in which I refer
to a “European Accounting
Authority” – but “European
Chief Accountant” better
capture the nature of the
enforcement mandate,
especially with reference to
the role of the SEC Chief
Accountant. It is to be noted
that in some EU member
states, including the United
Kingdom and Germany, the
public authority in charge of
IFRS enforcement is
distinct from the securities
regulator.
19. See for example
Deloitte, “2009 IFRS Survey
Results”, March 2009.